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ABSTRACT: Recent trends in infant (and adult) speech perception studies, especially in the psychological literature 
where much of the speech perception work is being and has been done, shows a growing focus on more integrated 
perception-production-sensorimotor (PPS) bases for perception (Werker & Gervain 2013). We look here at whether 
the results of such studies are significant for theoretical linguistics – specifically for the fundamental question of how 
the linguistic system is acquired. We examine a selection of recent experimental results, using Bruderer, Danielson, 
Kandhadai & Werker (2015) as the focal point.
Keywords: perception, production, acquisition, features.
RESUMEN: El vínculo entre la producción y la percepción y la teoría lingüística.– Las tendencias recientes en los 
estudios de percepción del habla infantil (y adulta), especialmente en la bibliografía de carácter psicológico en la que 
se ha enmarcado y se sigue enmarcando gran parte del trabajo sobre la percepción del habla, apuntan cada vez más 
hacia unas bases más integradas perceptivo-productivo-sensorimotoras (PPS) para la percepción (Werker & Gervain, 
2013). En este trabajo analizamos si los resultados de tales estudios son significativos para la lingüística teórica, 
especialmente por lo que se refiere a la interrogante fundamental acerca de cómo se adquiere el sistema lingüístico. 
Examinamos una selección de resultados experimentales recientes, tomando como punto de referencia el trabajo de 
Bruderer, Danielson, Kandhadai & Werker (2015).
Palabras clave: percepción, producción, adquisición, rasgos.
1. BACKGROUND
There have been some interesting and, in some cases
quite surprising, experimental results in the area of speech 
perception lately.1 Our purpose here, given the brief space 
we have, is to explore one such study in a relatively 
detailed manner with a view to attempting to uncover the 
significance of the results for theoretical aspects of pho-
nology and its acquisition. The study which we will focus 
our attention on is that of Bruderer, Danielson, Kandhadai 
and Werker (2015, henceforth BDKW). This study claims 
to have experimentally demonstrated that impeding the 
movement of the tongue-tip in 6-month-old English 
1 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for their 
thoughtful and extensive comments and suggestions.
environment infants negatively impacts these infants’ 
capacity to discriminate between a dental ([d̪]) and a ret-
roflex ([ɖ]) voiced stop.
This result is surprising in several respects. First, it 
seems to indicate a relationship between productive capac-
ity and perception which is counter-indicated by previ-
ous research on perception (Werker & Tees, 1984 inter 
alia). Second, it seems to necessarily locate the connec-
tion between perception and production in actual motor \
textit{activity} (as opposed to simply in, e.g., representa-
tions within the motor cortex). Of particular interest to 
us and to theories of phonology, these findings would 
indicate that our current understanding of the nature of 
features and how they relate to phonology is potentially 
flawed, especially the idea that phonology may be best 
conceived of as ‘substance free’.
Copyright: © 2019 CSIC. Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la licencia de uso y distribución Creative 
Commons Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0).
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It is important to be clear about the assumptions which 
guide our work, particularly since they may not be shared 
by researchers in other fields, such as psychology. We 
base our analysis on the following assumptions of the 
generative phonology enterprise, as follows:
• phonological representations consist of (sets of) 
features;2
• the set of features is given by UG;3
• modularity – both of the linguistic system within the 
larger set of cognitive systems and of the domains inter-
nal to the linguistic system e.g., phonology vs. syntax;4
• one must distinguish between linguistic competence 
systems and the performance systems with which 
they interact;5
• Our final assumption is that computation over lin-
guistic (phonological) features is divorced from the 
properties of the interface system – articulatory-
auditory – and is therefore ‘substance-free’ (à la 
Hale & Reiss, 2008).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we pro-
vide a detailed account of the BDKW experiments along 
with a discussion of what results would be expected under 
BDKW’s hypothesis as well as a discussion of the actual 
results. Section 3 presents several problematic issues in the 
BDKW study. Broader issues that arise in studies of this 
general type such as the relationship between the interface 
systems (articulatory-acoustic, in this case) and the lin-
guistic computational system, as well as how data should 
be interpreted relative to each, are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 discusses the role of ‘influence’ in assessing the 
cognitive capacities of the individual. We summarize the 
points presented in the paper in the final section.
2. BDKW 2015
2.1. The experiments
BDKW (2015) presents the results of three experiments 
designed to explore whether the well-established influ-
ence [in BDKW’s view—mh&mk] of speech production 
on speech perception in adults is a result of experience or 
2 `Features’ means simply ‘properties’. Entities which have all the same 
properties are necessarily the same entities — to differ, one needs to 
differ in at least one property. How such features are organized into 
groupings/sets is not of immediate relevance.
3 That is, the set of features are part of the representational apparatus 
provided for the interface modules by the human genetic code. This follows 
by virtual conceptual necessity — properties of events in the world which 
the human genome does not provide any representational apparatus for can 
never be present in the mind, neither for short-term nor for long-term 
storage. As such, they cannot play any role in the development or 
functioning of a mental computational system such as phonology.
4 Specifically, the relevant subset of the human representational 
apparatus made use of in linguistic computation differs from that used in 
extra-linguistic representation, and the set made use of in phonological 
computation differs from the set made use of in syntactic computation.
5 That is, the properties of the linguistic computational system (its 
entities and processes) are distinct from the properties of those non-
linguistic systems which feed it and make use of its outputs.
not [BDKW, 2015, p. 13531 abstract paraphrased].6 To 
determine the answer to this, BDKW examine the rela-
tionship between speech production and speech percep-
tion in early acquirers.
The BDKW study first replicated earlier work on infant 
perception of non-native contrasts and then introduced an 
additional production-related variable to explore the primary 
question of a relation between production and perception.
The subjects in these experiments were 6-month-old 
English-environment infants. The infants were tested on 
the non-native contrast7 between dental [d̪] and retroflex 
[ɖ] voiced stops.8
Experiment 1 was intended to replicate earlier experi-
ments on infants’ ability to perceive non-native con-
trasts, specifically here the contrast between voiced 
dental and retroflex stops. The auditory stimuli were 
tokens of [ɖ] and [d̪] culled from a single native speaker 
of Hindi. The experiment was set up in four trials for a 
total of 8 instances of 10-token sequences. In each trial, 
infants were presented with one each of the following – 
a 10 token sequence that was a repetition of the same 
token 10 times (Non-Alternating (NAlt) sequence) lasting 
20 seconds and a 10 token sequence which randomly dis-
tributed 5 tokens of the dental segment, [d̪], with 5 tokens 
of the retroflex segment, [ɖ] (Alternating (Alt) sequence) 
also lasting 20 seconds.9 There were four such trials per 
experiment (listed as Pair 1, Pair 2, Pair 3 and Pair 4 in 
the figures repeated from BDKW). As with comparable 
experiments, infant looking time was taken to be the 
measure of whether or not infants discriminated between 
differing tokens. Based on general trends in infant behav-
ior, diverse stimuli (Alt condition) will attract infants’ 
attention for a longer period than repeated identical stim-
uli (NAlt condition). Figure 1 of BDKW, repeated here, 
supports the conclusion that the infants note a difference 
between dental and retroflex voiced stops.
6 The theoretical import of the term ‘influence’ here and elsewhere to 
describe the production-perception relationship will be examined in 
greater detail below, as it is critical to understanding the impact that such 
claims have on theories of the linguistic computational system.
7 It is hard to explain the use of the term `contrast’ in this context, 
given that we are discussing the perception of speech sounds by 
6-month olds. The term is typically reserved for contrasting 
phonological representations that can only be deduced after a lexicon 
has been acquired (under standard assumptions, well after 6 mos.)
8 BDKW fail to note the following relevant phonetic details: (1) that 
dental [d̪] is potentially present in English-speaking environments in 
words such as ‘width’ [wɪd̪θ]; and (2) the degree to which the realization 
of the alveolar stop in ‘birdie’ or ‘hardy’ may align more closely, in 
articulatory/phonetic terms, with their retroflex tokens in these phonetic 
environments than with ‘normal’ English alveolars. In addition, we note 
that only phonetic brackets are appropriate here although BDKW use, 
incorrectly, phonemic brackets when discussing these tokens throughout 
their paper. When coupled with the use of ‘non-native contrast’ discussed 
in the previous footnote, this engenders unnecessary confusion.
9 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that ‘random’ is potentially 
significantly different than ‘alternating’ since it could result in 5 identical 
(to one another) tokens, e.g., 5 [ɖ]’s being followed by 5 identical (to one 
another) tokens, e.g., 5 [d̪]’s. Since the reported infants’ average looking 
time is 10 seconds, the stimuli (and arguably therefore behavior) 
between Alt and NAlt could have been effectively non-distinct in some 
particular set of 10 tokens.
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Experiments 2 and 3 were identical to Experiment 1 in 
every way except one. In each of these two experiments, 
the infant had a teether (held by the caregiver) in his/her 
mouth while hearing the stimuli.
Experiment 2 used a broad, flat teether which lay on 
top of the tongue tip and blade, impeding the movement 
of those parts of the tongue (labelled by BDKW as the 
‘flat’ teether). Experiment 2 was the critical experiment 
used to explore any effect of production on perception 
by preventing the articulatory movements required to 
make the sounds in the auditory stimuli. Experiment 
3 used a curved teether that followed the upper and 
lower gum line, which did not impede movement of the 
tongue tip or blade (labelled by BDKW as the ‘gummy’ 
teether). Experiment 3 was intended to be a control 
for any distracting effects of the simple presence vs. 
absence of a teether of any type.
Across the four trials there was a steady decline in 
average looking times, seemingly due to a ‘familiariza-
tion to task’ effect. As is the case in all such experimen-
tal designs, any significant difference in looking time 
between the two types of token pairings (in any trial) is 
taken to indicate that the child must be perceiving the 
phonetic difference present in the alternating tokens (oth-
erwise, they would be perceived by the child as being 
identical to non-alternating tokens). The results of these 
three experiments are presented in BDKW Figure 4, 
repeated below as Figures 1–3.
BDKW summarize their results for Experiment 2 – 
with the impeding ‘flat’ teether – as showing that infants 
“… failed to show evidence of discriminating a phonetic 
contrast…”; their reported findings for Experiment 3 – 
with the non-impeding, gummy teether – were that infants 
‘‘… successfully discriminated the Hindi /d̪/–/ɖ/ contrast, 
as did infants in Experiment 1’’ (pp. 13533–4).
The overall conclusion of BDKW was that ‘‘[t]hese 
findings implicate oral-motor movements as more sig-
nificant to speech perception development and language 
acquisition than current theories would assume and point 
to the need for more research on the impact that restricted 
oral-motor movements may have on the development of 
speech and language, both in clinical populations and in 
typically developing infants’’ (2015, p. 13531).
As described above, these experiments are designed to 
explore a potential relationship between production and 
perception where the former influences the latter. If such 
an influence exists, then we expect to see that in the form 
of certain experimental results. We describe the expected 
results below first, for purposes of comparison with the 
actual results.
2.2. Expected results
As we noted above, longer looking time differences 
between the Alt and NAlt Pairs indicate discrimination 
(one should generally speaking not act in a different man-
ner when exposed to the same stimulus). If BDKW are 
correct, we then predict that the absolute values of the 
looking time differences should pattern like this (direc-
tion of differentiation is not relevant to whether discrimi-
nation is taking place, obviously):
No Teether ≅ Gummy Teether ≠ Flat Teether
Expt. 1 ≅ Expt. 2 ≠ Expt. 3
Figure 1: Average response time, all 4 trials, Experiment 1 (A).
Figure 2: Average response time, all 4 trials, Experiment 2 (B).
Figure 3: Average response time, all 4 trials, Experiment 3 (C).
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That is, we would expect average looking time dif-
ferences for trials having alternating and non-alternating 
pairs (as all 4 trials did) with no teether (Experiment 1) 
and those with a ‘gummy’ teether (Experiment 3) to 
be essentially the same (since in these two conditions, 
according to BDKW, the child is perceiving the [d̪]–[ɖ] 
distinction) and to differ from the differences observed 
for those trials in Exp. 2 with a ‘flat’ (impeding) teether, 
as in Experiment 2 (since, according to BDKW, under 
these conditions the distinction is not being perceived, and 
the child is simply being presented with what is for him 
the ‘same’ data in the alternating as in the non- alternating 
pairs). BDKW predict, in particular, that the looking time 
differences between Alt and NAlt pairs will be greater in 
Experiments 1 and 3 than in Experiment 2. We turn now 
to the actual results.
2.3. Actual results
BDKW present the results for the average looking time, 
averaged for all subjects across all trials, in each of the 
three experimental conditions. In calculating differences 
in looking time between the alternating and non-alternat-
ing conditions BDKW took the Alt condition as a base-
line, calculating the difference between the two conditions 
by subtracting the NAlt looking time from the Alt look-
ing time.10 This is summarized in their Figure 5, repeated 
below (along with the caption of BDKW) as Figure 4.
Figure 4: Alt–NAlt difference score averages. Average 
difference in looking time between Alt and NAlt trials for each 
experiment (in ms). Scores greater than zero indicate an overall 
Alt > NAlt preference. Error bars denote SEM difference, and 
an asterisk indicates a significant difference (from zero), as 
reflected in the individual ANOVAs.
This figure would seem to indicate quite unambigu-
ously that there was discrimination between the [d̪] and 
[ɖ] segments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, but not 
in Experiment 2, as the authors concluded.
Below we present our attempt to render the results 
numerically, based on the graphs in BDKW repeated in 
Figure 1 earlier,11 as well as the patterning of the resultant 
10 Note that this leads to negative values should the infants look longer 
at the NAlt condition.
11 As noted above, the values thus have a small degree of imprecision.
values (grouping the two closest values with = or ≅, and 
the most distant value with >, or, if the difference is very 
large, with >>). Since discrimination is a function of the 
magnitude of the contrasting behavior, not on its direc-
tionality, we have used the absolute values of the looking 
time differences in establishing the ‘pattern’ column.12
Trial Expt.1 Expt.3 Expt.2 Pattern
1 2050 350 550 Expt.1 >>Expt. 2 ≅ Expt.3
2 500 800 800 Expt.2 = Expt. 3 > Expt.1
3 50 300 -250 Expt.3 ≅ Expt. 2 > Expt.1
4 700 1175 -950 Expt.3 ≅ Expt. 2 > Expt.1
Avg 825 656.25 37.5 Expt.1 ≅ Expt. 3 > Expt.2
BDKW, while appropriately considering the possibil-
ity of a ‘presence of teether’ effect (this was the purpose 
of running Experiment 3), concluded that teething toys 
‘‘… do not generally disrupt performance.’’ However, 
upon the first exposure to alternating and non-alternating 
stimuli (i.e., in Trial 1 for each experiment), the no-teether 
looking times of Experiment 1 differ by approx. 2050 ms, 
while the with-teether times show only approx. 550 ms 
(Experiment 2) and approx. 350 ms (Experiment 3) dif-
ferences.13 This large difference between no-teether and 
teether trials strongly suggests that the teethers were 
significantly ‘disrupting performance’, perhaps not sur-
prisingly distracting the infants from attending to the 
phonetic contrasts. In Trial 2, infants appear to have 
accustomed themselves to the teether and now treat the 
phonetic contrast as more interesting (800 ms difference 
in both Experiments 2 and 3), while infants who have 
already been attending to the data seem to be habituated 
to the contrasting tokens (500 ms difference, down from 
2050 ms in Experiment 1).
In every trial, the two with-teether experimental results 
(Experiments 2 and 3) pattern more closely together than 
either of them does with the ‘no teether’ experimental 
result. Only in the average of all pairs do we suddenly 
find Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 patterning together 
to the exclusion of Experiment 2. It is this averaging that 
the authors build their analysis around. But why does the 
average result diverge from that of every single pair? It 
turns out that the average diverges because, for reasons 
which are unclear but which can have nothing to do with 
the ability to discriminate, in Experiment 2 the differen-
tial preference shifts in Pair 3 and Pair 4 to a dispreference 
12 Therefore, for example, in Trial 3 the absolute value of the looking 
time difference in Expt. 2 is 300ms, and that of Expt. 3 is 250ms, making 
them significantly closer to one another than the 50ms of Expt. 1.
13 All numbers are approximate because they had to be extracted from 
the graphic reprinted above – the paper provides no detailed statistics for 
the trials. Since BDKW found statistical significance in their numbers 
and our numbers are similar (but not actual), we can assume, but not 
assert, that our numbers also show statistical significance. 
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(i.e., shorter looking time) for the Alt condition. Of course, 
the dispreference, like the preference, is only possible if 
one is distinguishing the two conditions. The negative 
values in the dispreference cases, when averaged with the 
positive values in the preference cases by BDKW, yield 
an average value in which the regular differentiation on 
Trials 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Experiment 2 disappears! In fact, 
using the absolute value of the differences for Exp 2, 
we get an average magnitude of difference of 637.5ms, 
directly comparable to the Exp 3 result of 656.25ms.
Given that Experiment 3’s average difference of 
approximately 656.25ms does not differ in a statistically 
significant way from Experiment 1’s average of 825ms 
(this is central to BDKW’s claim that the ‘gummy’ teether 
does not impede ‘perception’ of the relevant contrast), it 
seems pretty clear that the Experiment 2 average – taken 
now from the absolute value of the looking time dif-
ference – of 637.5ms will not do so, either. It certainly 
cannot differ in a statistically significant way from the 
‘gummy’ teether result of 656.25ms. Impressionistically, 
it looks like there is an initial ‘distraction’ effect of hav-
ing any kind of teether being held in one’s mouth at all, 
which fades as one accustoms him or herself to its pres-
ence. The reason for the inversion in looking times for 
Trial 4 in Experiment 2 is not clear to us, but of course 
the entire experimental paradigm (difference in behav-
ior entails perceptual distinction) entails that this result 
cannot be due to any failure to discriminate the alternat-
ing tokens. It should be noted that both familiarity and 
novelty effects have been found in the same experiment. 
As noted in McMurray and Aslin (2005, B20) “Although 
there are a number of hypotheses as to what factors affect 
the direction of preferences (i.e. novelty or familiarity), 
no consensus has emerged, and few studies make a priori 
predictions...”
3. STUDY-SPECIFIC ISSUES
We have noted that the actual results of these BDKW 
trials diverge from the expected results under their 
hypothesis that sensorimotor information may influence 
perception. Now we turn to more fundamental questions 
regarding the premises for such a hypothesis.
3.1. Articulatory Considerations
In the first case, we ask how the BDKW hypothesis 
could be correct – i.e., what the nature of speech percep-
tion would need to be for BDKW to get the results they 
believe they got in these experiments. Since impeding 
the actual articulation of the two stop segments being 
presented in the alternating pair condition would seem 
to be the relevant factor leading to the infants failure 
to discriminate, it seems we must conclude (as BDKW 
seem to do) that it is necessary to articulate a segment 
with a greater degree of accuracy than the ‘flat’ teether 
allows with respect to [d̪] and [ɖ] in order to perceive the 
two phonetic entities as distinct. The ‘gummy’ teether 
does not impede articulation in the relevant ways, and 
thus (the claim is) perceptual distinctness is maintained 
(as in the ‘no teether’ case). The teether, being in the 
mouth rather than the brain, can presumably only impede 
actual articulation, rather than, e.g., the motor cortex’s 
representation of an articulatory target. Such a target must 
come into being before the articulation it gives rise to. 
Therefore, if the infant is to attempt the actual articulation 
of something like [d̪] and [ɖ] (and she must, or how could 
impeding that specific articulation lead to non-discrim-
ination?), she must first build the relevant articulatory 
representation within the motor cortex. When no teether, 
or no ‘impeding’ teether, is present in the infant’s mouth, 
the infant can implement in some way this representation. 
With the teether present, such an attempt to implement 
fails because of the impeding teether.
Given the above, it seems necessary to assume that 
infants can construct representations in their mind which 
can provide the basis for articulatory action. One possi-
bility is that the same set of phonological features which 
capture the linguistically-relevant auditory properties of 
human speech are used to generate instructions to the 
motor cortex as well (a matter to which we will return 
below). However, as far as we know, there is no evi-
dence that infants at 6 months have sufficient motor skill 
development to willfully and intentionally produce the 
selection of sounds which they have been shown to dis-
criminate, including, for example, the voiced retroflex 
token of this study.14 Indeed, the evidence regarding the 
speech production capacity of young infants indicates 
pretty clearly that their production systems are, from 
the perspective of adult production, seriously impaired. 
‘Seriously impaired’ in this context means simply that, 
even when acting on the basis of relatively accurate 
articulatory representations (e.g., in the motor cortex), 
the infant cannot control and coordinate their systems 
well enough to produce adult-like, accurate-to-target 
articulations. If accurate perception of a [ɖ] requires 
that the child willfully and with some reasonable 
degree of accuracy implement the articulatory instruc-
tions for a [ɖ], we would expect the speech perception 
of a 6-month-old infant with no additional impediment 
beyond his own naturally impaired system to be exceed-
ingly inaccurate. And yet perceptual studies, some of it 
by authors involved in BDKW’s paper, have repeatedly 
shown that this is not the case.15
14 If evidence of such motor skill exists, it must be included as 
foundational support for the study. Note that only articulatory gestures 
that are the result of deliberate commands to the relevant parts of the 
motor system could possibly explain the experimental results – 
accidental, unplanned gestures that happened to produce a more 
articulatorily demanding sound are not relevant in this context.
15 It is worth pointing out that the well-known degradation of 
performance on discrimination tasks after experience with the 
environment language (10–12 months, Werker & Tees, 1984) obviously 
cannot be attributed to loss of motor skills, which not only become more 
and more sophisticated at those ages but which are clearly retained in 
cases of bilingual L2 acquisition (Hale & Kissock, 1997). It can only be 
attributed to the development of L1 featural representations (Hale & 
Kissock, 2007) in tandem with the `shedding’ from that particular 
grammar of never-encountered features (Hale & Kissock, forthcoming).
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Somewhat confusingly, BDKW state in their conclu-
sions that “Sensorimotor information from the articula-
tors selectively affects speech perception in 6-mo-old 
infants even without productive or perceptual experience 
with the speech sounds. These findings suggest that a 
link between the articulatory-motor and speech percep-
tion systems may be more direct than previously thought 
and is available even before infants accrue experience 
producing speech sounds themselves.” (2015, p.13535). 
If the infants have not and cannot (due to immature motor 
skills) produce the required articulatory configuration, 
it is not clear what the ‘sensorimotor information’ refer-
enced by BDKW could possibly consist of.
3.2. Casuality
A more serious problem with their hypothesis arises 
when attempting to determine what could cause the infant 
to construct the articulatory plan for a [d̪] or a [ɖ] when 
exposed to the alternating pair data. Clearly, the infant 
could only construct distinct representations for the two 
stops (which, according to the theory, they must do if 
they are to be able to perceive the distinction at all) if 
their brains have the information that the infant is being 
exposed to two distinct segments – and, to some reason-
able degree, to the nature of the distinction between those 
segments. That is, the brain must accurately process and 
represent the distinction between [d̪] and [ɖ] in order to 
eventually find that it cannot physically implement the 
difference articulatorily. This capacity to process and 
represent the acoustics of speech seems definitional of 
‘speech perception’, but BDKW clearly must mean some-
thing else by their use of this phrase, since their analysis 
could not logically stand otherwise.
While not proposed explicitly by BDKW, the only 
possible theory that might account for an actual causal 
effect of production-related events on perception is the 
‘forward prediction’ model. However, Hickok (2012) 
offers a thorough discussion of studies of ‘forward pre-
diction’ (used most typically to describe the predictions 
of the motor system about expected sensory feedback 
from particular actions) in perception based on transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies. He notes both 
conceptual and empirical problems with forward pre-
diction and the studies that are used to support it. These 
include: 1) divergent goals of forward prediction in motor 
as opposed to perceptual contexts – error vs. enhanced 
recognition, respectively; and 2) empirical evidence that 
shows that “...motor prediction in general tends to lead 
to a decrease [emphasis ours] in perceptual response...” 
(Hickok, 2012, p. 399). Most critically, however, Hickok 
notes that “… damage to the motor speech system does 
not cause corresponding deficits in speech perception 
as one would expect if motor prediction were critically 
important’’ (Hickok, 2012, p. 399).
Finally, BDKW’s study ignores the long-known 
acoustic-articulatory inversion problem – the many-to-
one relationship between articulation and acoustic signal. 
Lieberman & Blumstein (1988) pointed out early on that 
“… a human listener cannot tell whether a speaker pro-
duced a vowel like [e] by maneuvering his tongue… or by 
maneuvering his lips and larynx… unless the ‘listener’ is 
equipped with X-ray vision or insists on holding conver-
sations in front of X-ray machines’’ (169). Dealing with 
the many-to-one mapping remains a challenge for speech 
recognition and other computer-based speech applica-
tions as noted in Ji (2014).
4. BROADER ISSUES
The logical conundrum that requires the infants stud-
ied by BDKW to first discriminate perceptually between 
[d̪] and [ɖ] before they (eventually) can seem to fail to 
do so is paired with what appear to be insurmountable 
physiological barriers to obtaining results that would cor-
roborate their hypothesis. Additionally, the broader con-
siderations that motivated BDKW, such as results from 
adult studies and suggested links between articulation 
and perception, appear to be somewhat at odds with the 
BDKW study. We discuss these in turn below.
4.1. Lack of parallelism in adult studies
Studies with adult subjects differ in significant ways 
from the BDKW study.16 Since BDKW state that “[t]he 
influence of speech production on speech perception is 
well established in adults” (BDKW, 2015, p. 13531) and 
are inquiring into whether the same effects are found in 
infants (as opposed to being the result of many years of 
experience), it is worth exploring these differences. First, 
a number of studies cited by BDKW differ crucially in 
the nature of the stimuli the experimental subjects were 
exposed to, and thus to the subjects’ task in the experi-
mental setting. One of the studies that was closest in its 
focus on articulatory gestures and perception was Ito 
et al. (2009). In that study, the articulatory (in this case 
facial muscle) gesture was mechanically stretched into 
positions that matched or did not match (one of) the artic-
ulatory gestures of the relevant vowels found in a con-
tinuum between the words ‘head’ and ‘had’ (minimally 
different in vowel height) – a stretching action that pre-
sumably preceded or was simultaneous with the acoustic 
stimulus although the timing was not noted specifically.17 
Ito et al. (2009) found an effect on subject performance 
(word identification) where the facial stretch influenced 
the subject’s choice in cases of ambiguous tokens only, 
i.e., on the subset of stimuli which occupied acoustic 
positions between tokens of clear natural vowel qualities. 
Clear tokens were unaffected by facial stretch.
The Ito et al. (2009) stimuli (and, as a consequence, 
results) were critically different from the BDKW type. 
The tokens in BDKW were, we assume, intended to 
be unambiguous tokens of dental [d̪] and retroflex [ɖ] 
16 There are obvious reasons for certain differences given the difference 
in subjects -- infants vs. adults. These do not alter, as far as we can tell, 
the validity of the points discussed here.
17 Trials with a non-speech-like stretching gesture were also included 
but had no significant effect on subject performance.
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and were clearly distinguished by subjects in the no-
teether trials. (The Ito et al.\ (2009) subjects were given 
ambiguous tokens in both types of trials – without facial 
stretch and with facial stretch – with poor identification 
of the ambiguous tokens in all types of trials.) The cor-
rect comparanda between the adult (Ito et al.) and infant 
(BDKW) experiments therefore would actually be the 
adult performance on clear tokens with (all of) the infant 
performance (all of whose tokens were clear). Adult 
performance in the clear cases was unimpeded by facial 
stretch according to the graphs presented in Ito et al. 
(2009) as well as their discussion of results. We have, 
as a consequence, conflicting rather than corroborating 
results in the Ito et al. (2009) study and the BDKW study 
(as reported by BDKW).
Ito et al. (2009) and similar studies reveal the hardly 
suprising fact that information from other systems (in 
this case motor feedback) might sway subjects toward 
a particular choice when faced with stimuli that are dif-
ficult to identify because the acoustic input is ambigu-
ous. Any available additional source of information 
can and may be used by a subject to help disambiguate 
unclear acoustic input, including additional information 
from the lexicon (as ‘Ganong Effect’ studies demon-
strate, Ganong 1980). The principle – using all available 
input to disambiguate confusing signals – is the same 
in visual-based studies such as the ‘McGurk Effect’ 
type (McGurk & McDonald 1976 and many subsequent 
studies). Here, however, there is a deliberate attempt 
to sway the subject by presenting conflicting acoustic 
and visual input and then forcing the subject to decide 
which, if any, of the input is an accurate representation 
of the incoming data. (A frequent result here is a ‘com-
bination’ effect where subjects hedge their bets and use 
information from both inputs with a final decision locat-
ing the sound somewhere in between the two.) As in the 
Ito et al. (2009) case, the McGurk-type studies are not 
parallel to the BDKW study, though they differ in which 
aspect is not parallel. Unlike the McGurk-type stud-
ies, BDKW does not present conflicting external input 
to the subject. Instead, BDKW in some ways combine 
the physiological ‘impediment’ of the Ito et al. (2009) 
type with the clear acoustic input of the McGurk type, 
with the result that BDKW replicate neither type of study. 
What is common to all the studies just cited, however, is 
the multiplicity of cognitive modules being manipulated 
and tested. We return to the critical issue of identifying 
the multiple systems engaged in performance tasks in a 
later section.
4.2. Links between audition and articulation
The question of the nature of the ‘link’ between the 
articulatory-motor and speech perception systems is an 
important one. Studies such as Pulvermüller et al. (2006), 
cited by BDKW, demonstrate that perception of speech 
sounds causes activation in areas of the motor cortex, 
specifically, that there is a unidirectional link between 
perception and the relevant motor areas for speech 
production. Such a link seems conceptually necessary in 
any case to explain the acquirer’s ability to reproduce a 
particular acoustic output via articulatory gestures with 
no overt instruction.18 However, the evidence for the 
‘bidirectional relationship’ asserted in BDKW does not 
seem to be equally well-supported, at least in terms of 
the linguistic module. The studies cited in support of a 
production-influenced perception suffer variously from 
problems discussed earlier, some of the McGurk type 
(Sams et al., 2005), some of the Ito et al.\ type (Möttönen 
& Watkins, 2009, which drew all its data from ambigu-
ous/unclear tokens), and some of the TMS-based type 
discussed specifically in Hickok 2012 (D’Ausilio et al. 
2009). As pointed out in a quote from Hickok (2012) ear-
lier, if production were critical to perception, it would pre-
dict that damage to the motor speech system would result 
in perceptual failure – no such effect has been found.
What could be a possible ‘link’ between the articula-
tory-motor and speech perception systems in an infant 
which pre-exists articulatory experience, as alluded to in 
the quote above from BDKW’s conclusions (p. 13535)? 
The mental structures and representational capacities of 
this type – which exist and have their properties prior to 
experience – are precisely the types of objects posited as 
the components of genetic UG by linguistics for some 
fifty years. In the phonological domain, this is generally 
taken to include a feature system used in the construc-
tion of lexical representations, and computed over by 
the phonological computation system. There was some 
debate in the early period of modern linguistics as to 
whether it was preferable to have these features repre-
sent articulatory properties of the segments found in 
human linguistic systems or the acoustic properties of 
those segments. One might have thought that the issue 
would have been resolved long ago – the facts of phono-
logical computation could have easily favored one type 
of feature (e.g., the acoustic) as providing much cleaner 
analyses than those predicted by the use of articulatory 
features. Instead, the matter has largely been left to one 
side: Slavic linguists and those strongly influenced by 
the Jakobsonian tradition generally use acoustic fea-
tures, while mainstream generative phonology and other 
intellectual descendants of SPE use predominately artic-
ulatory features.
In Hale & Reiss (2008) we find a proposal for why 
this might be the case: if phonological computation pro-
ceeds without regard for the alleged substance (articula-
tory or acoustic) of phonological features, it makes sense 
that it is difficult for scholars examining phonological 
processes to find unambiguous evidence in favor of one 
type or another. Hale & Reiss argue that the question is 
a non-issue: one and the same set of features is used by 
both interface systems – both the articulatory and the 
perceptual interfaces. It is the system-specific (motor vs. 
18 The capacity for linking an acoustic input to a motor plan that 
might produce such an acoustic effect seems to exist independently 
from the linguistic system, since non-speech sounds can also be 
reproduced. The linguistic system may well have taken advantage of 
a pre-existing ability.
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auditory) transduction of this set of features that allows 
multiple system use. Both these interface systems being 
post-linguistic, linguistic computation has no access to 
the non-linguistic side of such transduction.19 
The features of the phonological system – innate, 
and thus pre-existing any specific linguistic experi-
ence –  provide just the desired ‘link’ between these two 
domains20 of a six month old infant – as Werker and Tees 
(1984) firmly established – can construct a mental repre-
sentation of the speech sound [ɖ], presumably leveraging 
this pre-existing, innate feature system and the (likewise 
innate) transduction system(s) for perception. This same 
feature representation can be transduced to an articulatory 
plan which, however, with or without an impeding teether 
the 6-month old’s performance systems will be incapable 
of accurately implementing.
Under such a conception of matters, the claims made 
by BDKW on the basis of their experimental data cannot 
be true. We have detailed several reasons for this: (1) the 
infant must perceive the distinction between [d̪] and [ɖ] 
in order to attempt to articulate it and subsequently be 
impeded in so doing by a teether; (2) the unified featural 
representation made use of in both perception and pro-
duction is involved in the transduction of either modality 
using innate mechanisms; and (3) as we have just argued, 
the 6 month old infant’s performance systems fail to 
accurately implement articulatory targets regardless of 
the presence or absence of artificially added impedi-
ments – yet the perception of phonetic contrasts at this 
stage is quite robust.
BDKW use a scale which somehow counts looking 
for 300ms longer at the alternating condition as indica-
tive of discrimination, but looking for 300ms shorter at 
that same alternating condition as failure to discriminate. 
Fortunately, a simple reworking of the statistics heed-
ing the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of differentiating 
looking times for the alternating vs. non-alternating con-
ditions yields sensible results. What appears to actually be 
going on in BDKW’s experiments is that the presence of 
the teethers, being held in place in the mouth of the infant 
by a caregiver for the duration of the testing, triggers a 
modest distracting effect with respect to attention to the 
segmental contrast present in the alternating trials, which 
fades on subsequent trials with a teether. The decline aris-
ing from task familiarization shows a similar trajectory 
both without any teether and with both kinds of teethers 
after that point. The discrimination-evincing behavior in 
the ‘impeding’ teether experiment shows an interesting – 
and at present unexplained – shift in looking preference 
for the NAlt condition over the Alt condition. If this is 
19 Although this claim is confined to the linguistic system and its 
relationship with additional systems (e.g., acoustic and auditory) that 
interact with it, it seems likely that other (non-linguistic) auditory and 
visual input have some corresponding type of representation-interface 
systems.
20 An explicit discussion of the link between, in our view, substance-
free phonological features and the external systems which interact with 
them is somewhat orthogonal to the matter at hand as well as too 
complex to treat fully within our space limitations.
more than a statistical fluke, further work should be pur-
sued to try to clarify just what it represents: but what is 
clear is that it cannot be explained by BDKW’s claim that 
there is a ‘failure to discriminate’ the alternating stim-
uli pairs in this trial. As Houston-Price & Nakai (2004, 
p. 344) note regarding the use of this type of ‘ looking 
preference’ experimental design: ‘‘[t]he direction of a 
looking preference is largely irrelevant when infants’ dis-
crimination ability or recognition memory is of primary 
interest; any deviation from random behavior indicates 
that a difference between the stimuli has been detected.’’
It is worth noting, as Houston-Price & Nakai go on 
to say (2004, p. 355), that “some infants will progress 
through the sequence of preferences more rapidly than 
others; if data are averaged across a group of infants, 
looking preferences may appear to be random at certain 
time points, despite individual infants showing clear 
familiarity or novelty preferences…” Thus, while we 
have emphasized the dangers of averaging across trials, 
especially with respect to how one establishes the values 
being averaged, we also note that averaging over sets of 
subjects gives rise not only to the methodological con-
cerns raised above, but to the problem that the object of 
linguistic research is the knowledge state of an individual. 
Not only is there no guarantee that an average represents 
any knowledge state, but, as in BDKW, conclusions about 
individuals (‘language acquisition’, e.g., is not a group 
enterprise) appear to be being drawn without the direct 
consideration of the actual behavior of any individual 
subject. The relevant data is not provided, but the numeri-
cal data cited is fully consistent with some subjects (if 
a significant minority) in fact showing ‘discrimination’ 
even under BDKW’s misanalyzed statistics in the flat 
teether experiment. But how could this be possible, given 
the explanation they propose?
5. KNOWLEDGE VS. BEHAVIOUR: THE ROLE 
OF ‘INFLUENCE’
BDKW take as a foundation the assumption that, in 
adults, speech production ‘influences’ speech percep-
tion, citing studies of McGurk-type effects from both 
visual and facial-sensory stimulus differences, inter alia. 
However, as we pointed out above, such studies, including 
the cited Sams, Möttönen & Sihvonen (2005); Ito, Tiede 
& Ostry (2009); D’Ausilio et al. (2009) and Möttönen & 
Watkins (2009), show only that an individual’s behavior 
when confronted by particularly challenging stimuli21 is 
the result of the aggregate effect of input from the many 
cognitive systems that humans possess – attention, mem-
ory, auditory, visual, conceptual, linguistic and so on. It 
is not at all surprising that the output of a single system 
may be masked by the combined output of other systems, 
nor is it surprising that, any at particular point, the ratio 
21 For example, stimuli synthesized to be precisely half-way between an 
[i] and an [u], or stimuli presented in a context in which much of the 
subject’s visual field is taken up by a large image of an articulating 
mouth, which the subject might reasonably conclude the experimenter 
would like him/her to attend to.
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of (apparent) contribution from one or another of these 
systems to the observed behavioral output will be differ-
ent. The way to clarify the role of each of these systems 
in giving rise to the observed data is to build as unam-
biguous and restrictive a model as is possible for each 
domain, rather than to weaken our model of each domain 
by allowing vague types of interpenetrability.
We see no evidence that the role of visual and sen-
sorimotor systems in speech perception is anything 
other than peripheral – no causal relationship has been 
established – and that innate features (transduced from 
auditory input) provide the necessary representational 
apparatus for the extraction of phonetic features in a 
clearly presented acoustic speech stream. Once repre-
sented in the feature system, the representation is avail-
able for articulatory ‘playback’ via transduction by the 
production systems, though in the infant these systems 
are normally inadequate for the generation of adult-like 
articulatory acts.
It is reasonable to ask, however, whether such 
peripheral ‘influences’ could have a significant (i.e. 
long-term/permanent) effect on acquisition (by prevent-
ing the acquirer from accessing the linguistic portion 
of the data of the input). BDKW, in their conclusions, 
call for:
… the reconsideration of theories concerning the 
 processing of speech during language acquisition: 
Such theories must account for the influence of sen-
sorimotor information on speech perception and 
determine the consequences or advantages of such 
a linkage as infants acquire the native language. 
(BDKW, 2015 p. 13535).
We asserted above that innate features provide the 
necessary apparatus for perception of speech sound con-
trasts as supported by BDKW and many earlier studies. 
However, as we discuss the role of influence, an impor-
tant question arises of whether those innate features 
are sufficient for successful acquisition. That they are 
not sufficient is the only interpretation of the BDKW 
hypothesis that we can imagine. This would entail 
that, extra-linguistic, physiological factors put acquir-
ers at risk in developing a linguistic system.22 Could, 
as BDKW state, ‘influences’ of this type be in any way 
critical to development?
As far as we know, support for such a hypothesis 
is completely absent. Data showing a critical impact 
(of extra-linguistic, physiological factors) on language 
development would need to show that children are 
affected in the long term – i.e., not simply in the trials 
of an experimental setting but over the course of the 
years of acquisition, resulting in a failure to acquire some 
aspect(s) of the environment language. One of the clear-
est instances of counter-evidence to production-percep-
tion influences demonstrated in the long term) of the type 
BDKW are suggesting can be seen in cases of infants 
22 Assuming normal physiology and environment.
who have undergone tracheostomies and been intubated 
for lengthy periods. Hill & Singer (1990), for example, 
studied infants who underwent this type of procedure at 
a mean age of 4.2 mos. and had the endotracheal tube in 
place for a minimum of 3 mos. Their conclusion, after 
testing the children at a little over 5 years (mean age), was 
that only expressive capacity (if any) was affected by the 
long-term disruption of speech-related laryngeal activity 
(due to the endotracheal tube). They state:
For the entire group of children, the overall measure 
of language functioning at follow-up were within nor-
mal limits and commensurate with cognitive ability. 
However, when a breakdown of results based on the 
children’s ages was done, a clear pattern of language 
disability was noted in the \expressive [emph. ours] 
language of the oldest group of children tested. (Hill 
& Singer, 1990, p. 15).
Vocal-fold vibration is inhibited by tracheostomy/
intubation; however, such vibration is required in the 
production of all voiced speech sounds and voiced 
sounds make up the majority of sounds heard in human 
running speech. If perception were critically influenced 
by production, the inability to produce voicing should 
have had a significant deleterious effect on perception 
of voiced sounds, resulting in failure to acquire normal 
receptive language (i.e., a comprehension deficit). As 
the study indicated, no such effect was found.
Furthermore, although completely anecdotal, it is 
relevant to note neither the virtual barrage of confused 
information from the physical world surrounding the 
infant nor the infant’s own non-speech oral activities 
(chewing, sucking, crying, making random noises), all of 
which occur routinely while getting language input from 
the environment, appear to have any interesting effect 
on acquisition. The vastly sub-optimal conditions under 
which language must be processed were pointed out by 
Chomsky (1965):
[the competence model assumes that the speaker- 
listener] knows its language perfectly and is unaffec-
ted by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention 
and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in 
applying his knowledge of the language in actual per-
formance. This seems to me to have been the position 
of the founders of modern general linguistics, and no 
cogent reason for modifying it has been offered. To 
study actual linguistic performance, we must consider 
the interaction of a variety of factors, of which the 
underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is only 
one. In this respect, study of language is no different 
from empirical investigation of other complex pheno-
mena. (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 3–4).
At this point, evidence points to the innate perceptual 
ability of infants as being not only a necessary but also a 
sufficient condition for the acquisition of the phonologi-
cal representations critical to language.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have argued that BDKW’s surprising 
claims about the role of articulation in speech perception 
arise from a statistical misinterpretation of significant 
aspects of their experimental results. We have also noted 
that the claims suffer from a logical flaw, requiring an 
incoherent conception of normal causality. In addition, 
we have called into question the validity of claims about 
the influence of non-linguistic stimulus on linguistic 
knowledge, noting that failure to attribute correctly the 
sources of performance/behavior to the appropriate cog-
nitive systems impedes rather than improves our under-
standing of such systems.
The BDKW study was not selected by us at random. 
Leaving aside its statistical shortcomings, the study 
reveals the wide gulf that seems to us to exist between 
the goals of much experimental literature regarding 
the linguistic system and those of the contemporary 
theoretical linguist. The former seems to be seeking to 
describe the ‘average’, or ‘majority’ behavior (perfor-
mance) of a selected population, rather than the cogni-
tive systems and external conditions that come together 
to produce that behavior on a particular occasion in any 
single individual. Since, in real world performance, 
observed behavior is always a result of a confluence 
of the effects of many systems, these are reasonable 
procedures for judging what kind of behaviors might 
exist. However, following the generative tradition of 
Chomsky and Halle (1968) and Chomsky (1957), our 
own (linguistic) interests lie in determining the proper-
ties only of the linguistic system — the types of rep-
resentations and computations possible in that module, 
along with some theory of how such knowledge comes 
to be instantiated in an individual (via a combination 
of UG and experience).23 A theory which posits ‘sub-
stance-free’ phonological features as a core component 
of the UG-provided knowledge the acquirer brings to 
his or her task seems to provide key insights into the 
pre-experiential ‘link’ between speech perception and 
speech production which BDKW express an interest in. 
Experimental work guided by explicit and clear theoret-
ical assumptions (whether of the ‘substance-free’ type, 
or assuming some other underlying ‘linkage’) remains 
a desideratum. The innate capacity for a perceptual \
textit{and linguistic featural} system in humans seems 
to already be well-established by earlier experimental 
results (Werker & Tees, 1984 and Eimas et al.\ 1971 \
textit{inter alia}) and provides the most productive 
foundation for further research.
23 As we noted earlier and as is well-established as a conundrum in 
the theoretical literature, the experience that the acquirer gets 
must be extrapolated from the effects of all of the external and 
internal extra-linguistic input. To date, however, all evidence points 
to the acquirer’s success in this domain barring, of course, special 
physical or physiological situations which prevent input from being 
received.
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